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Abstract: Most research on entrepreneurial activities and institutions focuses on identifying
certain relationships between formal and informal institutions and entrepreneurship across
economies. In this study, we advance entrepreneurship research by examining how social capital as
a characteristic of the institutional environment affects the relationship between formal and informal
institutions and entrepreneurial activities, differentially, in developing and developed economies.
Supporting institutional theory and social capital theory, the results from our sample of 39 countries
from 2001 to 2014, which contains over 30,000 identified individuals, indicate that social capital
has a stronger influence in the relations between institutions and entrepreneurship. In developing
countries, this influence is greater in the relationship between property rights, access to credit,
subjective insecurity, and entrepreneurial activity. In developed countries, the greater effect of social
capital is on the relationship between corruption and entrepreneurial activity.
Keywords: formal institutions; informal institutions; social capital; entrepreneurial activity in
developing and developed countries
1. Introduction
Several studies agree that the institutional context influences entrepreneurial activity [1–3], and in
developing economies, these institutional conditions differ and lead to different aspirations at the
enterprise level compared with in developed economies [2]. Prior research has posited the effects
of different types of institutions on entrepreneurial activity, analyzing in particular the differences
between formal and informal institutions [4–8], but few studies have analyzed the influence of different
institutional contexts. Therefore, there is a gap in the study of how different institutional scenarios
affect business growth and how this contributes according to the type of economy. Specifically,
there is a need to understand how characteristics of the institutional environment of a country, such as
trust, networking, and cooperative norms, may or may not favor the action of formal and informal
institutions. In that regard, social capital may provide unique insights into the important process
by which formal and informal institutions affect entrepreneurial activities. The analysis of social
capital refers to the structures of social organizations such as social networks and common norms
of benefits [9,10]. Social capital is built by means of personal resources accumulated through time,
allowing the establishment of relational ties [11]. At the same time, such resources can be used for
individual progress or to accomplish social objectives [12].
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Social capital has also been crucial in understanding entrepreneurial processes [13], because it
addresses the weaknesses of institutions, which often prevent them from ensuring the right conditions
for starting a business [2,14]. Afandi, Kermani, and Mammadov [15] pointed out that despite studies
that claim to have made significant progress in the analysis of social capital and its relation to
entrepreneurship, there are certain limitations in the empirical research. First, previous studies
have focused on the context of a single country and thus do not provide results that can be generalized
to a wider geographic context [16,17]. Second, the measurement of capital is usually limited, as it is
based on certain indicators that do not contemplate all its dimensions, revealing results that would not
be describing the real role of social capital on entrepreneurship.
This paper also aims to respond to these gaps in two ways. First, the analysis is performed
for a broader geographic context by including a comparison between developed and developing
countries. This arises because, in developing economies, the institutional conditions differ from the
entrepreneurial aspirations, just as they are different with respect to developed economies [18,19].
Second, to measure the concept of social capital, we employ the World Values Survey (WVS)
database, which contains eight indicators that are used to measure the three dimensions of social
capital [20]—norms, trust, and networks.
In this sense, this article develops a conceptual model in which we analyze formal institutions with
regards to property rights and access to credit, and informal institutions with regards to corruption
and subjective insecurity. We do this by comparing developing and developed countries and including
the moderating role of social capital, taking into account that the latter differs to a great extent between
countries [21] and, therefore, can operate differently in various institutional contexts.
The current research makes contributions to the literature by suggesting that the use of social
capital plays an important role for business growth, as entrepreneurs make use of it to respond to
institutional deficiencies [19]. In addition, it allows us to recognize which types of institutions are
most affected by social capital, whether formal or informal, and helps us to understand the differences
according to the level of development of the country. The hypotheses are tested using a logistic
regression model on panel data. A hierarchical model is used for developed and developing countries
in the 2001–2014 period, using the databases of the World Bank, the Index of Economic Freedom,
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), and the World Values Survey (WVS).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theory and develops the hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the data and measurement of variables. Section 4 estimates the lineal hierarchical
model, and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 develops the discussion, and Section 7 Robustness
Checks and Section 8 draws conclusions.
2. Theory and Hypotheses Development
2.1. Multidimensional Concept of Social Capital
Social capital theory explains how interpersonal networks allow access to social sustenance
and how they affect the strengthening of norms and social behavior. This theory confirms that
knowledge appears from the collaboration of people [22] in order to build larger networks with
profound personal implications.
The origin of the term arises with Bourdieu [23], who defined it as the total of real or potential
resources that are related to the existence of a network of lasting, recognized, and institutionalized
relationships. This concept is part of a classification of three dimensions of capital—economic, cultural,
and social. According to Bourdieu [23], social capital is a resource that appears in different areas
or social fields. Each of these social fields differs by importance of three dimensions of capital.
Social capital has two components; namely the connection of actors with social networks and the
symbolic capital, or objective differences, between groups that make possible the recognition and
distinction [23,24]
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Subsequently, authors such as Coleman [25], Nahapiet and Ghoshal [12] and Tsai and Ghoshal [26]
described social capital as an asset linked to relationships among individuals, organizations,
and societies. Coleman [25] identified three dimensions of social capital—trust, networks and
information channels, and civic norms and effective sanctions. By contrast, Nahapiet and Ghoshal [12]
and Tsai and Ghoshal [26], according to this perspective, also pointed out that social capital is a
three-dimensional construct—structural, cognitive, and relational. Structural social capital refers to a
general configuration between organizational actors and the means by which these are interconnected
to access a set of knowledge [27] Cognitive social capital suggests that the interrelations among actors
is created within the social structure, and it increasingly strengthens the existing social capital. Finally,
relational social capital is associated with the main normative dimensions, allowing mutual trust
among different actors [9].
Similarly, Putnam et al. [9] defined social capital as “those characteristics of a social organization,
such as trust, norms, and networks, which can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating
coordinated actions”. Although trust lacks a single concept, Paxton [28] suggested two types of
trust—trust in people and in institutions. These two types of trust help reduce uncertainty and
enable transactions to be carried out, promoting cooperation among individuals, organizations,
and institutions [29]. Norms are habits that contribute to differentiating between acceptable and
unacceptable behavior [15,30]. By contrast, civic norms are rules of conduct that are not written, but are
reflected when participating in social activities where public values and interests are emphasized [31].
These types of rules favor consensus among people and seek to improve the welfare of society.
Networks arise as a civic commitment that occurs through meetings with friends, family, professionals,
associations, and so on. [32]. By means of the networks, communication channels are formed to
obtain information, which increases cooperation. Given these definitions, this study assumes this
multidimensional perspective of social capital [20].
2.2. Entrepreneurial Activity, Institutional Context, and Social Capital
Bourdieu (1986) and Putnam et al. [9] contribute to understanding entrepreneurship as a social
practice. According to Mckeever, Anderson, and Jack [33]. from the perspective of these authors,
it is recognized that social capital has an important influence on entrepreneurship. The social capital
characterized by social networks provides the context within which entrepreneurs are embedded,
allowing entrepreneurs to cooperate with each other, favoring business growth.
According to this, the context of entrepreneurs involves different contacts and resources that
change in each phase of the entrepreneurial process, because during this process, people initially
may not know what kind of personnel and institutions can help them, but in more advanced stages,
the entrepreneur may act more selectively with connections compared with nascent entrepreneurs [34].
Moreover, high trust in individuals reduces the uncertainties in contracts [35] This relationship between
entrepreneurial activity and social capital helps us to understand the influence of institutional trust in
entrepreneurship. The effects of institutions on entrepreneurial activity may influence institutional
trust because they can allow or prevent individuals from enterprising [15]
Social capital and its main dimensions have been analyzed in different disciplines (such as
economics, sociology, law, and education) [11,33,36] and at the micro and macro levels. The relation
between social capital and institutions is evident at the macro level, where the strength of social
networks is mainly the result of the political, legal, and institutional environment [37]. The ability
of social groups to act together depends on the stability of formal institutions that exist in the
entrepreneurial ecosystem or country context [10]. For example, in emerging economies, there is low
social capital because economic transactions are greatly influenced by private interests or individual
relationships [38]. Cleaver [39] affirmed that institutional incapacity increases extra costs for all
economic activities and creates negative effects from the collaborative activities that come from society.
This level has been analyzed in recent articles, and their contribution confirms that social
capital does have an effect on growth [40]. However, it is necessary to analyze what determining
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factors drive growth [41]; among these are high-quality institutions and entrepreneurship education.
According to Kim and Kang [42], one of the less studied mobilizing factors of economic growth is
entrepreneurship. Kwon and Arenius [43] suggested that social capital at the regional/country level
drives entrepreneurial activities in that area, allowing to demonstrate that individual activities are
affected by their close relationships with network ties and a broader social environment.
According to Koellinger [44], although developing countries have high imitating entrepreneurial
activity, they still can manage to obtain some sort of economic benefit. Additionally, Koellinger [44]
supported the view that developing countries have a high effect on the accessibility of opportunities
to create new businesses to the extent that some countries have a different distribution of factors
of production within society, allowing entrepreneurial activity to take place without innovation.
Bosma and Levie [45] pointed out that entrepreneurial activity and its perception of opportunity is
higher in efficiency-driven economies than in innovation-driven economies. Alvarez et al. [46] found
evidence for Latin American countries (factor-driven and efficiency-driven economies) and concluded
that the socioeconomic context (unemployment, lower education level, etc.) has an influence on
entrepreneurial activity.
Other studies have confirmed that developed countries allow access to resources and the
development of networks [47]. Social networks are the most invaluable resource that an entrepreneur
has; they facilitate the detection of when and where to start an entrepreneurial activity, as well as how
to find the available resources (human, financial, etc.) [14].
However, previous entrepreneurial experiences have influenced the development of social capital to
the extent that networks help to decrease the difficulties that are present from the start [14]; they increase
the availability of resources [48] as well as the opportunities for discovery [49]. For instance, Nahapiet
and Ghoshal [12] argued that social capital and networks generate positive conditions to discover
entrepreneurial opportunities through the creation of new knowledge. Networks help to access
information and build knowledge in order to approach an entrepreneurial opportunity [50].
2.3. Formal Institutions and Entrepreneurial Activity: The Moderating Role of Social Capital
According to Verheul et al. [51], entrepreneurship has been strengthened by the institutional
approach, arguing that the social and cultural contexts determine the final decision to start a business.
Institutions are the rules of the game that regulate the economic, social, and political relationships
in a society [52]. There is a distinction between formal and informal institutions [52]. The formal
institutions are regulations; contracts; and political, legal, and economic rules that limit individual
behavior. Gnyawali and Fogel [53] identified four institutional dimensions from the point of view of
entrepreneurship: (1) government policies and procedures, with institutions such as property rights,
business freedom, and labor freedom; (2) socioeconomic conditions, including the attitudes of society
and governments toward entrepreneurial activities; (3) entrepreneurial and business skills, such as
education, training programs, and so on; and (4) financial and nonfinancial assistance, emphasizing
access to credit, financial freedom, and other aspects. In this paper, the formal institutions analyzed
are property rights and access to credit.
One of the key elements of corporate activity is property rights, which constitutes an important
formal institution that offers the appropriate incentives to entrepreneurs. Property rights avoid
expropriations against the entrepreneur [54]; this encourages the creation of companies because the
entrepreneur has greater protection for his operations [55].
It is also recognized that entrepreneurial activity tends to be affected by financial limitations.
In most cases of enterprise creation, entrepreneurs tend to need financing to get their business started;
for this reason, access to financing tends to involve one of the formal institutions with more influence
over entrepreneurial activity [5].
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2.3.1. Property Rights
In general, an appropriate protection of property rights for all types of entrepreneurship
contributes to the growth of commercial activities, as it decreases the investment risk [56] and promotes
innovatory behavior [57].
For Acemoglu and Johnson [58], two important aspects must be taken into account regarding
property rights; that is, expropriation risk, whether it is due to the arbitrariness of the government
or other actors, and the quality of institutions in charge of guaranteeing the protection of property
rights. In this sense, the limitations of the government in regard to its capacity to confiscate wealth
ensure the protection of property rights and thus favor entrepreneurship [59]. Thus, the restriction to
the arbitrary use of power by politicians guarantees the protection of property rights, encouraging
entrepreneurship [60].
However, social capital contributes to the protection of property rights that matter for
entrepreneurial activity [61]. The trust supports important determinants of the market expansion
activities by solving collective action problems, providing an environment associated with secure
property rights, and improving economic performance [61,62]. According to the definition of
Putnam [9], social capital comprises the features of a social organization, such as trust, norms,
and networks, that improve the efficiency of society; thus, social capital increases the economic
efficiency of property rights because it contributes to overcoming the limitations of a formal institution,
such as property rights, that are rules configured to control economic interaction [63]. This relation
between property rights and social capital encourages long-term contracting and is essential for the
creation of firms and economic development [63]. In other words, social capital affects entrepreneurial
activity via the property rights channel, but this relationship is more feasible in developing countries
where formal institutions are less efficient [64]. For Ahmad and Hall [61], it is reasonable to expect that
social capital would have possibly caused economic growth in developing countries to a greater extent
than property rights, because although in these countries, the formal institutions such as property
rights are lacking, the economies continue to grow. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Social capital moderates the relationship between the protection of property rights and
entrepreneurial activity, having a greater effect in developing countries than in developed countries.
2.3.2. Access to Credit
There are limitations on access to credit depending on the type of activity to be developed;
the amount of necessary capital to start activities; and the activity’s risk level, including the location of
the company; among others [65,66]. Therefore, greater access to credit positively affects the creation of
new companies and the expansion of existing ones [55]. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs tend to start their
business activities with their own capital, given the limited credit that financial institutions tend to
offer to this type of entrepreneurship [67]. Cardoza et al. [68] suggested that there is limited availability
of financial resources to encourage corporate activity in Colombia. In general, favorable conditions
to grant credit are given to big companies, while banks are not willing to finance new and small
companies, considering that these do not have guarantees and possess liquidity restrictions [69]. In the
face of this situation, small and new companies must resort to financial sources by means of their
families or personal contacts, or they must access banking credit through the bribing of employees of
the banking institutions [70]. Shoji et al. [71] pointed out that poor social capital causes low trust in
partners, and this possibly leads to less access to informal credit because the entrepreneurs suffer from
low trust toward making business with others. This negative relation may suggest the possibility of
social capital moderating the relationship between access to credit and entrepreneurship.
Sustainability 2019, 11, 550 6 of 20
One of the options to access credit in emerging economies is by means of aspects such as trust in
social networks that make available informal credit sources [72,73], because social capital improves
credit market accessibility through social collateral mechanisms [74]. Hence, entrepreneurs in emerging
countries can access other sources of credit through social capital, which favors the creation of firms.
On this basis, the following hypothesis is proposed.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Social capital moderates the relationship between access to credit and entrepreneurial
activity, having a greater effect in developing countries than in developed countries.
2.4. Informal Institutions and Entrepreneurial Activity: The Moderating Role of Social Capital
According to North [52,75], informal institutions refer to traditions, values, beliefs, social norms,
and practices that define a society’s culture. Compared to formal institutions, informal institutions
operate at a more tacit level, where both elements work in conjunction; while formal institutions
regulate economic activities, informal institutions shape the perceptions and judgments of the self,
others, and their environment [76]. The literature on entrepreneurship has emphasized the importance
of informal relationships in society, because these shape the propensities of social groups toward
entrepreneurship [48].
The World Bank measures informal institutions, including various factors of governance such
as the process of electing governments, the capacity of the government to formulate and implement
policies, and the perception of citizens about the state of institutions [77].
For their part, Douhan and Henrekson [78] proposed that the inefficiency of institutions may
affect entrepreneurship, including corruption as an informal factor that can affect the entrepreneur’s
perception and his or her motivation to create a new business. In some emerging economies, violence
is an informal institution because it causes a significant decline in the performance of firms [79].
Insecurity is an additional factor affecting entrepreneurship, and its negative effects increase the costs
of investing in new businesses [80].
In this paper, we analyze corruption and subjective insecurity as informal institutions. Corruption
is defined as the inappropriate use of public power to obtain private benefits [81,82]. Corruption
presents a negative impact on a country’s economy to the extent that it impedes its development, slows
down the creation and enacting of social policies that favor citizens, hinders public funds, increases the
salary gap, and creates a negative image that disincentivizes foreign investment [81,83,84]. By contrast,
subjective insecurity is the perception that each individual builds about the risk level faced in the
city [85].
2.4.1. Corruption
Meanwhile, corruption decreases the motivation of the entrepreneur to create a new business
because of the high transactional costs that must be incurred [86]. In addition to this, corruption can
favor consolidated companies that might take advantage of public resources to increase their benefits,
discouraging the formation of new businesses [81].
Corruption also tends to appear in the institutional social context [87]. In countries where
people tend to move away from legal norms, any illegal behavior becomes normal as long as it is
accepted and followed by many people [88]. In this way, corrupt behavior may become a social norm,
and an individual might carry out unlawful business if there is a high business-based perception
that other businessmen do it as well [28]. However, if the control of corruption considered as an
informal institution is analyzed, this tends to improve the entrepreneur’s incentive to create new
businesses [89]. Now, a greater control of corruption tends to be present in developed countries [90]
while in a developing country, the control tends to be deficient, and thus corruption tends to have a
pronounced negative effect on the entrepreneurial activity [91].
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Analyzing each of the components of social capital, according to Mitchell [92] networks are
constituted by information, exchange, and expectations; thus, social networks are frameworks for
evaluating the behavior of people in different situations [93]. High levels of trust in institutions and
compliance to norms can lower practices of corruption [87,94]. Finally, if anticorruption values are
strongly shared within society, this will be more likely to result in an incentive for entrepreneurial
activity [59,87]. Additionally, the networks act as a monitoring agent of public administration.
This behavior introduces better managerial practices that affect organizational growth [87].
Social capital could be a good explanatory factor for the reduction of corruption in developing
and developed countries—a situation that would improve the probability of starting new firms.
However, the social context and the policies for eradicating corruption usually tend to be more feasible
and more common in developed countries [87]. Aidt [95] contended that in developing countries,
efficient corruption arises to facilitate the trade between agents that is not possible otherwise. In these
countries, the corruption is good for economic growth because the institutions are poor, and corruption
reduces bureaucracy [96]. However, the control of corruption is lower in developing countries than
in developed countries, and the impact of social capital also tends to be smaller. On this basis, the
following hypothesis is proposed.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Social capital moderates the relationship between corruption control and entrepreneurial
activity, having a greater effect in developed countries than in developing countries.
2.4.2. Subjective Insecurity
A favorable social environment is an incentive for entrepreneurship. Problems with violence
and lack of safety are barriers to entrepreneurship, and trust and loyalty among individuals are
fundamental [80]. The perception of citizen insecurity requires more spending on the part of
entrepreneurs, who must invest in safeguarding their businesses from the negative effects of violence
and insecurity. The perception of insecurity is common in developing countries. Economic and social
inequality are the main causes of insecurity and conflict. In this context, it can be difficult to do
business, particularly formal business activities [3].
However, one of the ways to improve the perception of insecurity is through social capital.
Inter-group interactions can help to resolve conflict and increase the welfare of countries [97].
Developing countries are constrained in the ability to invest in all forms of capital; thus, increases in
social capital are stimulated to combat the threat of insecurity [97]. Several forms of social capital,
such as social networks and trust, can help individuals to protect themselves from situations of
insecurity. According to Sawyer [98], neighborhood watch schemes began in the United States in the
1970s and were exported to other countries. Such schemes were also created in developing countries
as a community response against thefts and other crimes; therefore, this relationship is usually higher
in developing economies, where the perception of insecurity is greater than in developed economies.
Finally, the development of social capital to combat insecurity leads to individuals making use of a
greater number of networks and taking advantage of them to increase entrepreneurial activity based
on the discovery of new opportunities [99]. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Social capital moderates the relationship between subjective insecurity and entrepreneurial
activity, having a greater effect in developing countries than in developed countries.
3. Materials and Methods
Sample and Data Collection
We tested four hypotheses about the relationship between formal and informal institutions and
entrepreneurial activity in developing and developed countries. This paper uses an unbalanced panel
of 39 countries (Annex 1) for the years 2001 through 2014.
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The sample uses data available in the GEM survey, which contains over 30,000 identified
individuals (other studies with GEM [100,101]). Additionally, these data are complemented by those
of the WVS and the World Bank in order to obtain information about social capital and the variables of
control. These measurements will be explained in detail in the following sections.
4. Measures
Dependent variable: Our dependent variable is total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) taken from
the GEM survey. Nowadays, the GEM data set is highly recognized as an important source of
information for analysis of entrepreneurship because it collects data from different countries and builds
comparative results [89,102,103]. Through a common methodology for all countries, entrepreneurs and
their environment are described. This contrasts with other databases, which include limited countries
for which the measurements differ. Since 1999, GEM has collected information for numerous aspects
of entrepreneurship and thus shows indicators of entrepreneurial activity.
TEA measures the level of entrepreneurial activity in each country from 2001 to 2014. Moreover,
to meet our research objectives, two groups of countries were created, developed and developing,
taking into account the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), which serves as a reference
to identify those countries with high levels of development. The TEA is calculated as the percentage of
the adult population between 18 and 64 years of age who have initiated a new business or own or lead
a young business.
Independent variables: The social capital variable is measured on the WVS survey. Eight indicators
are used to measure the three dimensions of social capital [9] norms, trust, and networks. The data
were grouped into tracts of five years each. For the period analyzed in this paper, we looked at the
1999–2004, 2005–2009, and 2010–2014 surveys. The WVS is carried out through face-to-face surveys
in 43 countries and collects political, cultural, economic, and behavioral information. The first step
was to perform a factorial analysis on the WVS. This analysis included the trust, norms, and network
variables contained in the survey. This method of data reduction is justified so as to accomplish a more
robust measure of the social capital concept [104] The total of the sample was 83,017. The factorial
analysis used the method of main components, and all items were reduced to a single factor that
accomplished a charge of over 0.60 [105].
All variables were not available for all years and countries. According to Tabellini [106] this
situation is not problematic given that cultural values shift slowly through time. In this sense,
social capital had low variation on almost all of the analyzed countries in the WVS survey over
the studied term.
By contrast, the variables of property rights, corruption, and subjective security are measured
by the World Bank, and we used the available data between 2001 and 2014. Lastly, data for access to
credit are from the GEM database, with data available for all the studied years.
Control variables: For this study, the ages of the population and economic growth variables were
included from the World Bank database. These variables have been used in previous research to control
the TEA [89]. We considered the total population between the ages of 15 and 64, representing the
number of people who could potentially be economically active. Economic growth rates are measured
as gross domestic product (GDP) growth at purchase prices, represented by the sum of gross value
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not
included in the value of the products.
Table 1 summarizes the variables, definitions, and sources.
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Table 1. Description of the variables.





Total early-stage entrepreneurial activity.
Percentage of adults aged 18–64 setting up a
business or owning/managing a young firm




Social capital (moderator variable)
The proxies of social capital are as follows: trust
in others, participation in groups or associations,
the index of civic cooperation, confidence in
public services, confidence in political
institutions, confidence in armed forces and







Property rights Property rights protection across judicial systemsagainst theft and expropriation. IEF 2001–2014







Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public
power is exercised for private gain, including
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as





Perception of insecurity, perceptions of the






Population age (PA) 15–64
Total population between the ages of 15 to 64,
representing the number of people who could
potentially be economically active.
WGI 2001–2014
Economic growth rate (EGR)
Gross domestic product (GDP) growth at
purchase prices is the sum of gross value added
by all resident producers in the economy plus
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not
included in the value of the products.
WGI for the period
2001–2014
a. Sources World Governance Indicators (WGI) by World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx;
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), http://www.gemconsortium.org; index of economic freedom (IEF),
http://www.heritage.org/index; WVS (World Values Survey), http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.
5. Estimation Method
The data were analyzed with a lineal hierarchical model between 2001 and 2014, with the
dependent variable TEA and independent variables—property rights, access to credit, subjective
insecurity, and social capital. This model was performed on developed and developing countries.
Lineal hierarchical models allow the inclusion of effects associated with two or more levels.
Our case allows the combination of effects associated with the country and individuals. According to
Liu and Gupta [108], these models also allow the performance of progressive adjustments by steps in
order to know the relevance of each independent variable in explaining the dependent variable.
In this paper, we propose a model with three levels [109,110].
Model 1: Model with variables of control. This level aimed to test the variance that existed
between countries on the dependent variable for the period between 2001 and 2014.
Model 2: Model with control and principal variables. In this phase, we analyzed the annualized effects
of each variable—social capital, property rights, access to credit, corruption, and subjective insecurity.
Model 3: Model with control, main, and moderation variables. This last model permits the
inclusion of all the variables under analysis, including the main effects of each variable and the
interaction variables. These variables are included because of the acknowledgement that social capital
affects TEA, but also boosts its effects and is in contact with other institutional factors, both formal
and informal.
In mathematical terms, the final model would be as follows [110,111]:
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Level 1: β0j = β0 + µoj; β1j = β1 + µ1j; β2j = β2 + µ2j; β3j = β3 + µ3j
Level 2: Z = χ × y; Z2 = χ2 × y2; Z3 = χ3 × y3
The mode was calculated by aleatory effects, where it is assumed that the countries were taken
from a larger population, thus allowing the generalization of the effects to all groups of countries.
In this sense, the aleatory effects permit the acceptance of the existent variation among countries
in regard to the degree of entrepreneurial activity (TEA). Hence, a mean of 0 was assumed, with a
variance that is constant and correlated with the rest of the covariables [112].
6. Results
Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviations, and correlation of the variables used in this study
for developed and developing countries. TEA is correlated with all the formal and informal institutions
of this study. Once the correlations were obtained, we tested the multicollinearity for each group
through variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF values are low in all models—control, main effects,
and the model with moderations. The highest VIF is 1.52 in the model with moderations, but this is
still far from the acceptable limits.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Mean
Std.
Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
TEA 3.589 4.1 2.612 0.345 1
Property rights (PR) 3.195 17.42 4.511 8.228 0.1262 1
Access to credit (AC) 4.135 0.975 3.167 0.291 0.4454 0.0295 1
Corruption (C) 1.221 0.964 4.416 0.123 −0.3879 −0.1896 0.1233 1
Subjective insecurity (SI) 3.23 0.562 5.636 1.26 −0.49 0.125 0.1456 0.0145 1
Social capital (SC) 2.4534 1.964 1.242. 1.123 −0.1317 0.0082 0.2321 −0.1134 −0.1082 1
Population age 15 to 64 3.23 0.562 5.636 1.26 −0.3341 0.2295 −0.4935 −0.1483 0.5163 −0.648 1
Economic growth rate (EGR) 3.23 0.562 5.636 1.26 −0.1241 0.01495 −0.5235 −0.2683 0.5163 −0.648 0.012 1
Table 3 shows the general results of the hierarchical models applied for developed and developing
countries. The first model was applied with the control of the variables, then the main effects were
included, and finally the effects of the moderation were included. In Table 3, we can see that for both
groups, the complete model (Model 3 for both types of countries) has better adjustment indicators
related to the change in F that is significant (p < 0.00), allowing us to conclude that it is the best model
for both groups.


















1 0.589 a 0.346 0.342 0.969 0.346 77.125 0
2 0.635 b 0.403 0.392 0.931 0.056 9.039 0
3 0.657 c 0.432 0.416 0.913 0.03 4.938 0.002
Developed
country
1 0.619 a 0.362 0.358 0.929 0.362 79.252 0
2 0.682 b 0.433 0.430 0.942 0.070 10.055 0
3 0.711 c 0.451 0.448 0.943 0.18 6.927 0.000
a Predictor: (Constant), PA, EGR; b Predictor: (Constant), PA, EGR, PR, AC, C, SI, SC; c Predictor: (Constant), PA,
EGR, PR, AC, C, SI, SC, PR × SC, AC × SC, C × SC, SI × SC; Dependent variable: TEA.
Table 4 shows the results of the aleatory-effect lineal regression model. Model 1 includes only
control variables, and the TEA is considered as a function of population age (PA) and economic growth
rate (EGR). By contrast, Model 2 estimated the control and principal effect. The TEA is a function of
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PA and EGR and the main effects of formal and informal institutions, such as property rights, access to
credit, corruption, subjective insecurity, and social capital.
Finally, in Model 3, both of the previous blocks of variables were included, with the addition
of social capital moderating formal and informal institutions. All the models are significant and a
high explanatory power was obtained, explaining more than 68% of the TEA variance for both types
of countries.
The third model for developing and developed countries confirms that all informal institutions
have statistical significance and affect entrepreneurial activity (p < 0.005).
Concerning the hypotheses testing, Hypothesis 1 proposed that social capital positively moderates
the relationship between the protection of property rights and entrepreneurial activity, having a
greater effect in developing countries than in developed countries. The coefficient for developed and
developing countries is positive and significant (developed countries: b = 0.15620, p < 0.01; developing
countries: b = 0.17461, p < 0.01).
Therefore, not only is entrepreneurial activity influenced by property rights, but it also positively
influences social capital. The results also show that the coefficient in developing countries is higher
in comparison with developed countries, supporting Hypothesis 1 (t = 3.15, p > 0.01). This may
be explained by the fact that in developing countries, the construction of social capital serves to
improve the absences or flaws in the regulation of property rights, becoming a powerful strategy to
improve TEA.
Hypothesis 2 suggests that social capital positively moderates the relationship between access to
credit and entrepreneurial activity, having a greater effect in developing countries than in developed
countries. This hypothesis is supported by our data; the presence of opportunities to access credit
in conjunction with social capital affects entrepreneurial activity (developed countries: b = 0.1636,
p < 0.01; developing countries: b = 0.1861, p < 0.01), and the results also show that the coefficient in
developing countries is higher in comparison with developed ones (t = 2.16, p > 0.01), in line with the
literature [72,73].
Table 4. Estimating TEA with formal and informal institutions.
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Significance: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that social capital positively moderates the relationship between corruption
control and entrepreneurial activity, having a greater effect in developed countries than in developing
countries. This hypothesis is also confirmed (developed countries: b = −0.0754, p < 0.01; developing
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countries: b = −0.10018, p < 0.01) (t = 3.12, p > 0.01); the existence of social capital helps to control the
negative effects of corruption on entrepreneurial activity.
Hypothesis 4 suggests that social capital positively moderates the relationship between subjective
insecurity and entrepreneurial activity, having a greater effect in developing countries than in
developed countries. This hypothesis is confirmed for developed and developing countries (developed
countries: b = 0.1314, p < 0.01; developing countries: b = 0.1899, p < 0.01) (t = 3.29, p > 0.01). As with
the previous hypothesis, the relevant role of social capital is confirmed as a social construction of
mechanisms to increase the levels of entrepreneurial activity (TEA).
Graphics 1 and 2 show the moderating effect of social capital for the relationship between TEA
and each of the dependent variables included in the model (property rights, access to credit, corruption,
and subjective insecurity) for both developed and developing countries. The y-axis of each graph
represents the values obtained for TEA for different values of social capital in developing countries
(Figure 1) and for developed countries (Figure 2) introduced in the estimated regression function.
On the x-axis, the different values of each dependent variable are presented.
In Figure 1, we can see that the values indicated inside the graph represent the effect of property
rights (PR), access to credit (AC), corruption (C), and subjective insecurity (SI) on TEA for each social
capital (SC) level. Furthermore, to compare the significance of the moderating effect of SC, which is
the object of the hypotheses, it is verified in all cases because the change in the effect between low and
high levels is significant. (PR × SC: βalto−βbajo = 5.22; t = 4.86; p < 0.01; AC × SC: βalto−βbajo =
4.562; t = 4.62; p < 0.01; C × SC: βalto−βbajo = 2.002; t = 1.92; p < 0.01; SI × SC βalto−βbajo = 1.802; t =
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property rights, SC—social capital; (b) AC—access to credit, SC—social capital; (c) C—corruption, 
SC—social capital; (d) SI—subjective insecurity, SC—social capital. 
In the case of Figure 2, it can be observed that the significance for the four hypotheses is also 
fulfilled (PR×SC: βalto−βbajo = 5.42; t = 4.91; p < 0.01; AC×SC: βalto−βbajo = 6.034; t = 5.41; p < 0.01; 
C×SC: βalto−βbajo = 1.002; t = 1.98; p < 0.01; SI×SC βalto−βbajo = 1.502; t = 2.09; p < 0.01). 
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In the case of Figure 2, it can be observed that the significance for the four hypotheses is also
fulfilled (PR × SC: βalto−βbajo = 5.42; t = 4.91; p < 0.01; AC × SC: βalto−βbajo = 6.034; t = 5.41;
p < 0.01; C × SC: βalto−βbajo = 1.002; t = 1.98; p < 0.01; SI × SC βalto−βbajo = 1.502; t = 2.09; p < 0.01).
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Through graph analyses, this study allowed us to verify that high levels of social capital produce 
better levels of entrepreneurial activity (TEA); in other words, social capital is a highly effective 
strategy to counteract the negative effects of corruption and subjective insecurity, and it enhances the 
effect of access to credit for entrepreneurship and protection of property rights. 
These positive effects are seen in developing countries, where the social conditions provided by 
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In the case of developed countries, the effect of mediation is significant for all cases, but only 
when it moderates the relationship between corruption and TEA can it have a greater effect in these 
countries compared with developing countries, as suggested by Hypothesis 3. For the other 
institutions, the opposite effect is achieved. These results suggest the possibility of improving the rate 
of entrepreneurial activity based on the creation of social trust, civic norms, and behavior that can be 
highly accepted and successful in developing countries where the absence of formal institutions and 
control entities is pronounced. 
7. Robustness Checks 
We performed robustness checks on our results. Historical time series analyses can have 
different problems or reach limited conclusions because of the change in associated time structures. 
Our analysis covered a 14-year time period. We utilized a jackknife resampling technique to check 
the robustness in our results. This technique is convenient for estimating the robustness of these types 
of models [113]. The results confirm that sub-survey estimations (jackknife) are very comparable to 
the original results—providing assurance for the original estimations.  
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The current study offers opportunities to enrich the entrepreneurship literature. Specifically, we 
extend our understanding of social capital based on the approaches of institutional theory and social 
capital to argue for the moderating role of social capital on the relationship between formal and 
informal institutions and entrepreneurial activity, comparing developed and developing countries. 
The findings allow us to comprehend three important aspects. First, social capital is understood as 
an informal institution given that it encompasses certain aspects of a country’s or region’s social 
conditions that are perceived by its inhabitants, such as trust in people and institutions, trust in social 
networks, and civic norms or rules of behavior. Second, social capital intervenes in the relationship 
between formal and informal institutions and entrepreneurial activity, being regarded as 
characteristic of the social organizations that contribute to better functioning of such institutions. 
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7. Robustness Checks
We performed robustness checks on our results. Historical time series analyses can have different
problems or reach limited conclusions because of the change in associated time structures. Our analysis
covered a 14-year time period. We utilized a jackknife resampling technique to check the robustness in
our results. This technique is convenient for estimating the robustness of these types of models [113].
The results confirm that sub-survey estimations (jackknife) are very comparable to the original
results—providing assurance for the original estimations.
8. Conclusions
The current study offers opportunities to enrich the entrepreneurship literature. Specifically,
we extend our understanding of social capital based on the approaches of institutional theory and
social capital to argue for the moderating role of social capital on the relationship between formal and
informal institutions and entrepreneurial activity, comparing developed and developing countries.
The findings allow us to comprehend three important aspects. First, social capital is understood
as an informal institution given that it encompasses certain aspects of a country’s or region’s social
conditions that are perceived by its inhabitants, such as trust in people and institutions, trust in social
networks, and civic norms or rules of behavior. Second, social capital intervenes in the relationship
between formal and informal institutions and entrepreneurial activity, being regarded as characteristic
of the social organizations that contribute to better functioning of such institutions. Third, differences
regarding social and economic conditions between developed and developing countries cause social
capital’s input to differ, tending to be positive in those countries where the weakness of formal and
informal institutions is stronger, which means that in developing countries, social capital works
as another kind of informal institution that permits the combating of the weakness so as to favor
entrepreneurial activity.
The results support the evidence found in other papers referenced in this article. Social capital
improves a society’s efficiency and, therefore, the rules that configure economic activity. Among them
are those that protect property rights, achieving a greater impact in developing countries, where fewer
controls and guarantees for rights exist [64].
In developed countries, access to credit is more favorable for entrepreneurs; these countries have
economic stability and thus sound financial leverage, whereas in developing countries, given the
process of development they face, there are weak financial institutions and policies to finance the
creation of new businesses. Given the above, social capital plays an important role in these economies
given that personal or family credit sources tend to prevail over access to financial institutions.
Trust and the creation of social networks tend to be the route of access to informal credit, which allows
the development of entrepreneurial activity [72]. A similar situation occurs with informal institutions.
Developing countries usually have less control of corruption, and there is lower trust in institutions
and their efficiency. In this case, social capital tends to be more relevant in developed countries,
where trust in institutions is higher. Thus, social capital usually improves the context of corruption in
the promotion of entrepreneurial activity, but its impact is greater when dealing with economies where
there are strong anti-corruption policies, as in the case of developed countries [87] Something similar
happens with the perception of insecurity, which tends to be greater in developing countries. Many of
these countries face problems of violence and criminality, which go against the interests of creating new
companies. For this reason, social capital may help to counteract such a perception of insecurity to a
higher degree in developing countries, where, despite the perception of insecurity by their inhabitants,
trust among people and other norms of legitimate behavior may counteract subjective insecurity and
motivate entrepreneurial initiatives [97].
From these results, it may be concluded that social capital allows the exploration of other channels
by means of which a country’s institutional weaknesses may be counteracted, seeking to favor economic
development by means of entrepreneurship. Because of this, the main implication is centered on the
opportunity that countries have to take advantage of their citizens’ perception of societal functioning
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so as to improve the general performance of institutions. It is worth highlighting the importance that
informal institutions have in those countries where formal institutions are especially weak, as people
are able to rely on informal institutions to regain trust and boost the creation of new businesses that
contribute to economic development. Finally, the findings of this research imply that trust, relationships
with others, and norms of civic cooperation as components of social capital are more effective in
developing countries than in developed countries, because the latter have stronger institutions as well
as greater control of corruption. In developing countries, social capital would reinforce such control.
Our research offers practical implications as well. The findings reported in this study show
that one of the main functions of policy makers is the promotion of policies to entrepreneurs.
This function must be fulfilled in all countries. Our results show that if policy makers want to
stimulate entrepreneurial activity, they must discover ways to increase social capital through plans,
strategies, rules, and norms. Although social capital is a collective construction or informal institution,
policy makers can help in developing a social integrated environment inside cities and countries.
Additionally, promoting social capital may be good for policy makers in the long run. High social
capital always brings benefits to TEA through property rights and credit access. At the same time,
it reduces the negative impact of corruption and subjective insecurity. This is highly important
especially for developing countries, where formal institutions are very weak and informal institutions
like social capital can help improve entrepreneurial activity.
There are many possibilities for new studies based on these results, including studies where
every component of social capital and individual contributions to the functioning of institutions and
entrepreneurial activity may be specifically analyzed through empirical analysis at the country and
regional level.
We surveyed 39 countries, but other countries face a different institutional environment,
which may affect the impact of social capital on the relationship between formal and informal
institutions with regard to entrepreneurial activities, as well as differences in developing and developed
countries. Future research is needed to improve the country database and to examine the validity of
our model in other countries and groups (e.g., for continents and regions).
In addition, entrepreneurial activities measured by our study can be improved by taking
entrepreneurial behavior into account. We propose including the notion of levels of entrepreneurship
rather than classifying individuals as entrepreneurs or non-entrepreneurs. In doing so, we can examine
differences over time across countries.
Data availability is a common limitation, given that it is not easy to access a single database
for most countries with the necessary variables and time spans. It was for this reason that a panel
of data was not estimated, because while the WVS database is governed by tracts of years, other
databases measure the variables annually. While this limitation was overcome in this study, it would
be interesting for future research to resolve this through the construction of surveys by country, which
would contain these types of variables, at least initially, at the country level.
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